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Abstract
Employment protection (EPL) has a well known negative impact on labor flows
as well as an ambiguous but often negative effect on employment. In contrast, its
impact on capital accumulation and capital-labor ratio is less well understood. The
available empirical evidence suggests a non-monotonic relation between capital-labor
ratios and EPL: positive at very low levels of EPL, and then negative.
We explore the theoretical effects of EPL on physical capital in a model of a firm
facing labor frictions. Under standard assumptions, theory always implies a motononic
negative link between capital-labor ratios and EPL. For a positive link to arise, a very
specific pattern of complementarity between capital and workers protected by EPL
(senior workers, as opposed to unprotected new entrants, or junior workers) has to
be assumed. Further, no standard production technology is able to reproduce the
inverted U-shape pattern of the data.
Instead, endogenous specific skills investment leads to an inverted U-shape pat-
tern: EPL protects and therefore induces investments in specific skills. We develop
such a model and calibrate the returns to seniority by using estimates from the em-
pirical literature. Under complementarity between capital and specific human capital,
physical capital and senior workers having accumulated specific human capital are de
facto complement production factors and EPL may increase capital demand at the
firm level. The paper concludes that labor market institutions may sometimes favor
physical and human capital investments in second-best environments.
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dre Janiak acknowledges financial support by Fondecyt (project no 1120593). Etienne Wasmer acknowl-
edges support from ANR-11-LABX-0091 (LIEPP), ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02 and ANR 2010 BLANC 1819
01 (EvalPolPub).
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1 Introduction
An expanding literature investigates the role of employment regulations on var-
ious outcomes such as investment in physical capital, human capital, productivity,
innovation and growth. Labor studies have shown that a particular component of
these regulations, employment protection, has sizeable effects on unemployment rates,
turnover, job flows and unemployment duration. Employment protection legislation
(hereafter, EPL) has a well known negative impact on labor flows and an ambiguous
but often negative effect on employment.1
The effect on investment and the capital-labor ratio is less well understood and,
in the empirical literature, the effect of EPL is ambiguous. In articles based on
countries characterized by low employment protection stringency, the effect of EPL
on capital-labor ratios is found to be positive. For example, Autor et al. (2007)
use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protections by U.S. state courts from the late
70s to the late 90s to evaluate the link between dismissal costs and other economic
variables. With firm-level data, they find a positive effect of employment protection
on the capital-labor ratio. More recently, Cingano et alii (2014) use a labor reform
in Italy - known for being a country with a relatively low degree of employment
protection in small firms. The authors exploit an interesting quasi-experiment and a
regression-discontinuity design, the reform being applied differently below and above
the 15-employees threshold. They show that the capital-labor ratio may increase
after an increase in firing costs, with however a decline in total factor productivity.2
On the other hand, papers focusing on countries with strong employment protection
document a negative relationship. Cingano et alii (2010) find a negative effect on
capital per worker in the case of European firms.3 Calgagnini et alii (2009) also
document a negative effect of employment protection on investment in a sample of
firms from ten European countries. Hence, the effect of EPL may therefore be non-
linear, and in particular, positive for investment at low values of EPL, and negative
for investment at higher values, which would reconcile the various empirical findings
of these papers. This paper precisely analyses the effect of employment protection on
capital accumulation and capital-labor ratios and attempts to reconcile the various
findings in the literature.
Our paper is guided by the intuition that, at low levels, EPL may induce more
capital investment and not less capital investment, for theoretical reasons that need
1Influential papers have investigated the role of employment regulations on other dimensions such as
productivity and growth: Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Bertola (1994) argue that productivity is
lower because of a misalloaction of employment to technologies, favoring less productive structures, leading
to reduced incentives for capital accumulation. Bassanini et al. (2009) empirically document the link
between employment protection and productivity growth and find that EPL reduces productivity growth
in industries where EPL is more likely to be binding. There is also an emerging literature on the pattern
of trade specialization: Saint-Paul (1997, 2002) shows that countries with a rigid labor market will tend
to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle and therefore innovate less,
rather immitate. See also the more recent paper by Cuñat and Melitz (2010). There is a very active and
broader literature extending models of trade to imperfect labor markets e.g. Costinot (2009).
2As the authors argue, their empirical analysis supports several findings of our paper, discussed below.
3Their methodology follows Rajan and Zingales (1998): it compares the impact on the demand for
capital in sectors requiring large job reallocation with sectors where job reallocation is low.
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Figure 1: Capital-labor ratio and employment protection stringency in the OECD
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Notes: data on employment protection is from OECD (2004) and data on capital-labor ratios is from Caselli (2005). On the graph, the
capital-labor ratio is expressed as a ratio relative to the US ratio.
to be developped. Inspection of data shows, without a claim on causality, Figure 1 at
least suggests that an inverted U-shape pattern tends to emerge from the data: the
x-axis is the standard OECD stringency index and the vertical axis is the capital-labor
ratios. At low EPL level, the correlation is positive, and it becomes negative when the
index becomes larger than 1.75. The regression analysis in Table 1 confirms this, but
also the fragility of the correlation. The inclusion of a dummy variable for Anglo-Saxon
countries leads to a negative and significant coefficient on EPL, while the inclusion of
a dummy for “high EPL” countries produces a positive and non-significant correlation.
Overall, the correlation coefficient is negative (-0.34) and in the regression, the linear
effect is negative but not significant. The correlation coefficient is equal to 0.40 when
Greece, Mexico, Portugal and Turkey are removed from the sample and takes the
value -0.67 when Anglo-Saxon countries are not considered. To sum up, at low EPL
level, the correlation is positive, and it becomes negative when the index becomes
larger.
We will indeed show the following results:
i) In the simplest setup with only physical capital and labor, there is a negative
link between capital-labor ratios and EPL for standard production functions. When
capital and labor are complements, the demand for capital per unit of labor has to
decrease if EPL negatively affects labor productivity.
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Table 1: Regressions of capital-labor ratio on EPL stringency
Specifications: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
EPL index -0.088 -0.253*** 0.079 0.490**
(0.053) (0.069) (0.048) (0.184)
Squared EPL index -0.141***
(0.044)
Anglo-Saxon dummy -0.499***
(0.158)
High EPL dummy -0.663***
(0.127)
Notes: data on employment protection is from OECD (2004) and data on capital-labor ratios is from Caselli (2005). The Anglo-Saxon dummy
is equal to one for Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. The high-EPL dummy is equal to one for Greece, Mexico,
Portugal and Turkey. ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%
ii) A positive link may arise due to a specific pattern of complementarity between
capital and workers protected by EPL (hereafter we call such workers senior workers,
as opposed to unprotected new entrants, or junior workers). The intuition is the
following: EPL increases the share of senior workers in employment. When senior
workers are complement with capital, this raises the demand for capital. Hence,
higher EPL leads to higher investment in physical capital. However, the positive
link remains monotonic over the whole range of EPL values: no standard production
technology is able to reproduce the inverted U-shape pattern.4
iii) When workers invest in specific skills, the impact of EPL is however non-
monotonic and leads to an inverted U-shape pattern. The reason is that EPL protects
and therefore induces investments in specific skills. Assuming complementarity be-
tween capital and specific human capital is natural and therefore, the complementarity
between capital and senior workers discussed in ii) above becomes an endogenous out-
come of the model: EPL raises the demand for capital through raising the share of
senior workers. Further, the size of this effect on investment in physical capital varies
with the intensity of employment protection: it is higher at low levels of EPL, and
lower at higher levels of EPL. Indeed, given decreasing returns to scale in human capi-
tal, at higher levels of EPL, a marginal increase in EPL has little effect of investments
and therefore on demand for capital. This generates the hump-shape curve.
iv) For low values of EPL, our model implies both a positive effect of EPL on
capital-labor ratios and a negative productivity effect due to greater misallocation of
workers, consistent with Cingano et alii (2014).
We base our analysis on a model of a large firm with physical capital, facing
labor-market matching frictions and endogenous job destruction. Labor frictions have
indeed been shown to be key in understanding the effect of employment protection
on labor market flows and the demand for factors (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
Starting from their setup, we can explore the effect of EPL on the demand for cap-
ital. This requires to extend the benchmark model of EPL to endogenous capital
accumulation.
4It is always possible to find a more complex production function leading to an inverted U-shape pattern
but this would arguably be an artificial way of reproducing the empirical results.
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It also requires to introduce these ingredients in the so-called large firm matching
model developped initially in Pissarides (1990). The large firm matching model re-
quires the derivation of a set of wage determination rules that are more complex than
the conventional Nash-bargaining solution. Indeed, the large firm, when it bargains
over wages with its different workers, can exploit the possibility of complex strategic
interaction à la Stole and Zwievel (1996a, 1996b). In their setup, in a frictionless
labor market, decreasing returns to scale lead the bargaining firm to raise employ-
ment above the competitive level, in order to reduce the marginal product of labor
and progressively reduce wages - driven down to the reservation wage at the optimal
employment level of the firm. Here, with bargaining over wage and search frictions,
the same issue arises because the presence of physical capital in production imposes
decreasing returns to scale in labor. Decreasing returns to scale in labor require the
firm to take into account that, in over-hiring, it can reduce the marginal product of
workers and therefore the bargained wage. This leads to higher profits than if the
firm simply ignored these interactions. These effects were analyzed in the context of
a matching model in Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Cahuc, Marque and
Wasmer (2008) and Bagger et alii (2011). Hereafter they are referred to as intrafirm
bargaining.5
Hence, in order to answer the question of the effect of employment protection on
capital accumulation, we proceed as follows:
1. We generalize the large firm bargaining model to endogeneous job destruction
à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), implying in particular to move from a
countable number of categories of workers to a continuum of substitutable work-
ers with different productivities.
2. We generalize the intrafirm bargaining model to the existence of a dual employ-
ment structure with firing taxes affecting only senior workers and not junior
workers.
3. We generalize the large firm matching model to endogenous specific human cap-
ital investments and study the fixed skill models as a limiting case.
A literature suggests a positive relation between employment protection and invest-
ment in specfic human capital. Arulampalam et alii (2004) and Brunello (2004) il-
lustrate with data from the European Commission Household Panel a positive link
between EPL and training. Though the cost of training is typically paid by the firm
and it is not clear that all components of training reflect specific human capital, this
evidence is supportive of the mechanism we propose in this paper. Our paper is also
related to the work by Belot et alii (2007). These authors document a hump-shaped re-
lation between employment protection and growth. They then present a three-period
model, where the hump is the result of two opposite forces. On the one hand, employ-
5Elsby and Michaels (2013) study the business-cycle and cross-sectional properties of a large-firm model
with endogenous job destruction. In their model, job destruction appears because of indiosyncratic shocks
to firm-level productivity. In our case, it is the productivity of each individual employee that is hit
stochastically. Our model is more tractable because we do not need to consider the presence of an inaction
region along the labor demand schedule. The job creation and destruction relations in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) even correspond to a specific case of the relations presented in Section 3 (when the
production function is linear). However, a drawback of our model is that it does not generate zero-
employment growth for a subset of firms, as Elsby and Michaels (2013) do.
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ment protection increases the cost of job separation. On the other hand, it encourages
workers to invest in specific human capital. See also Saint-Paul (2002) who analyzes
the political economy consequences of this mechanism. His model generates multiple
equilibria, because of the mutual feedback between employee rents and employment
protection.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the labor demand
block of the model; in Section 3, we derive labor demand, capital demand, the bar-
gaining conditions over wages and the optimal investment in human capital. Section
4 presents simulation results for a large class of production functions. Section 5 con-
cludes that labor market institutions may sometimes favor physical and human capital
investments in second-best environments.
2 Labor inputs and labor demand
2.1 Setup
Time is continuous and discounted at a rate r. We study the steady state of an
economy populated by a representative firm and a unit mass of workers. The firm
produces output with labor and capital in quantities N and K respectively. The
output can either be re-invested, consumed or used to cover other expenses such as
vacancy costs and layoff costs.
There are two sources of labor heterogeneity within the firm. First, at the extensive
margin, there are two seniority levels within the firm: workers are hired as junior and
eventually become senior. Each junior-senior status implies a specific set of rules and
assumptions regarding labor regulation, wage negotiation and productivity, which are
fully described below. Second, at the intensive margin and within the senior status,
workers have different levels of efficiency.
When hired, a worker starts as a junior and is therefore endowed with one efficiency
unit as a normalization. Junior workers subsequently become senior at an exogenous
rate λ. When hit by this shock, the amount of efficiency units each worker is endowed
with changes too: it is equal to hiz, where hi is the level of human capital of a senior
worker, discussed later in the paper, while z is a stochastic component specific to that
worker. The value z is drawn for each newly senior worker, independently, from a
cumulated distribution G (and density g = G′) defined over the [0, 1] interval. As
time goes, senior workers subsequently face changes in the z component. Changes
occur at a rate λ. The new z is drawn from the same cumulated distribution G.6
A key assumption is that human capital h is determined before the productivity
z is known, as the outcome of an ex-ante investment. This will notably imply that,
in equilibrium, all senior workers will have a common level of human capital h.
The firm may endogenously choose to destroy jobs upon the revelation of produc-
tivity following an idiosyncratic shock. In particular this occurs when the stochastic
6It is beyond the scope of this paper to study alternative stochasticity assumptions as for instance den
Haan et al. (2000), Walsh (2005), or Krause and Lubik (2007). These alternative assumptions are however
very useful in DSGE contexts and, for a study of the shorter-run relations between EPL and K/N ratios.
Short-run and business cycle implications of the effect of EPL, not studied here, are important topics and
should receive some more attention.
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component of worker’s efficiency drops below a threshold R(h) ∈ (0, 1), the value of
which is determined below. Note that R depends on h, the level of human capital of
senior workers, and this will be taken into account in skill investment decisions. An-
other important remark is that the firm, having perfect access to capital market, may
keep workers with a negative marginal net revenue, since the shock on z is temporary.7
Finally, when fired, a worker joins the pool of unemployed. Leaving the firm
implies that, upon re-entry, senior workers will start as junior workers with the entry
productivity of junior workers, namely 1: the level of specific human capital hi cannot
be transferred to another job, by definition.8
2.2 Labor market frictions and steady-state employment
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions. This implies
the existence of frictional unemployment. In particular, the firm posts vacancies at a
flow cost c in order to hire workers. The labor force is normalized to 1 and we denote
by V the mass of posted vacancies. Vacancies are filled at a rate q(θ) that depends
negatively on the labor market tightness θ ≡ V1−N , i.e. the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. This rate is derived from a matching function m(1 − N,V ) with constant
returns to scale, increasing in both its arguments, concave and satisfying the property
m(1 − N, 0) = m(0, V ) = 0, implying that q(θ) = m(1−N,V )V = m(θ−1, 1). Similarly,
the rate at which unemployed workers find a job is equal to θq(θ).
Denote by N = NJ +NS where NJ and NS ≡
´ 1
R nS(z)dz the mass of junior and
senior workers respectively, and nS(z) is the mass of senior workers employed by the
firm, who are endowed with z efficiency units. Their laws of motion are described by
the following equations:
N˙J = V q(θ)− λNJ (1)
and
N˙S = λ(1−G(R))NJ − λG(R)NS . (2)
In the steady state, flows into aggregate employment equal flows out of employ-
ment. This leads to the following steady-state level of total employment, itself a sum
of senior and junior employment, as:
N = NS +NJ =
θq(θ)
θq(θ) + λG(R)
, (3)
7Note also that the degree of persistence varies with our parameter λ (productivity shock frequency). As
a result, high frequency leads to firms keeping their workers even if they have temporarily low productivity
and possibly negative cash flows. This productivity parameter and EPL introduced later have similar
consequences on labour hoarding. This similarity fully applies in a world of perfect capital markets. See
den Haan et alii (2003) for imperfect capital markets. Studying the channels through which credit market
imperfections amplifies the effect of EPL is beyond the scope of this paper but they are rich.
8Note also, following a discussion with a referee, that our setup does not necessarily imply that senior
workers are more heterogenous than junior workers. Our view is that junior workers are sort of temporary
workers, that is, ex ante identical ; they may be different but the firm only has the information after the
λ shock (acquisition of seniority) is realized ; at this stage it decides to truncate the distribution and only
keep good matches. Hence, the pool of junior workers is not necessarily homogeneous. It is just that
firms do not know yet and make the optimal vacancy decisions in waiting for the correct signal of their
productivity has appeared.
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while the unemployment rate is the complement to 1:
u =
λG(R)
θq(θ) + λG(R)
. (4)
Given that inflows and outfows into an interval of productivity z and z + dz are
independent of z, this implies that the mass nS(z) of senior workers at productivity
z is simply equal to:
nS(z) = NS
g(z)
1−G(R) .
The last important stock variable is the mass of senior workers within the firm,
and expressed in efficiency units. It is the sum of its individual components. We
denote it by Z, and
Z(h) ≡
ˆ 1
R
znS(z)
(ˆ
Ci(z)
hidi
)
dz =
ˆ 1
R
znS(z)dz
ˆ
Ci
hidi = h
ˆ 1
R
znS(z)dz = Z(h),
where h is the vector of human capital of its workers, i(z) is an individual in a mass
of workers of productivity z ; Ci(z) is the subset of these individuals ; Ci is the subset
of all individuals regardless of their produccitiy z ; and h is the total human capital
in the firm, equal to
´ 1
R
´
Ci(z) hididz =
´
Ci hidi . The second equality where
´
Ci hidi
is taken away from the integral over z arises from the fact that the distribution of
skills hi is independent of the level of z due to the assumption that human capital
choices are done ex ante. Further, Z(h) can eventually be written as a function of
the scalar h since each component of h, hi, turns out ex post to be independent of
the productivity component of identical marginal workers. In what follows, we write
for simplification Z(h) except when it is necessary to distinguish between individual
and aggregate components of productivity hiz. Note that our specification excludes
heterogeneity in the ability to acquire skills, to preserve the symmetry of the choice
of human capital.
Physical capital accumulation follows
K˙ = I − δK, (5)
which describes the dynamics of the capital stock. We consider here a simplified
capital accumulation and depreciation process and do not consider additional cost of
installing physical. See however Yashiv (2014) and the subsequent references for the
effect of these additions to the matching model. I is investment in capital, δ is the
capital depreciation rate.
Finally, production Y follows a constant-returns-to-scale production function that
is strictly concave in each argument, here the three stock variables:
Y = F (NJ , Z(h),K)
2.3 Bellman equations of workers and firms
Workers invest in specific skills at the time of entry. They do so at cost C(hi)
on the spot, with C ′(hi) > 0 and C ′′(hi) ≥ 0. The productivity of the investment in
human capital is however differed, and adds up to productivity only when workers
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become senior. The h component is thus endogenous. The special case with fixed
human capital is obtained when h cannot be chosen by workers, e.g. when C(hi)
becomes vertical around the equilibrium value.
The present discounted value of being unemployed is defined as
rU = b+ θq(θ)Maxhi [WJ − C(hi)− U ] , (6)
where b is the flow value of being unemployed ; Wj is the present discounted value of
being employed as a junior worker and U the value of unemployment. Junior workers
earn the amount WJ until they become senior or leave the firm. It takes the following
value:
rWJ = wJ + λ
ˆ 1
0
[max {WS(z, h), U} −WJ ]dG(z) (7)
and the present discounted value of being employed as a senior worker with z efficiency
units and h units of human capital is:
rWS(z, h) = wS(z, h) + λ
ˆ 1
0
[max
{
WS(z
′, h), U
}−WS(z, h)]dG(z′). (8)
We assume that when a senior worker is laid off, the firm pays a firing tax T that
is not redistributed to the worker but lost to the match - e.g. an administrative cost
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). The total value of the firm is therefore
Π¯ = max
V,I
1
1 + rdt
{(
F (NJ , Z(h),K)− wJNJ −
ˆ 1
R
ws(z, h)nS(z)dz
− cV − I − λ(NS +NJ)G(R)T
)
dt+ Π¯′
}
, (9)
subject to equations (1), (2) and (5). In equation (9), dt is an arbitrarily small interval
of time,
2.4 Wages
We restrict the analysis to the solutions in a stationary state in which the mass of
senior workers in efficiency units Z is constant.9
Denote by ΠJ = ∂Π¯∂J the marginal value of a junior worker. Entry wages are
negotiated à la Nash between the worker and the firm. We denote by β ∈ (0, 1) the
bargaining power of workers. Hence, the wage of a junior worker is determined as
follows:
wJ = arg max ΠJ
1−β [WJ − U ]β , (10)
Denote by Πz = ∂Π¯∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
the marginal value of a senior worker endowed with z
efficiency units. The firm applies the following rule at z = R:
ΠR + T = 0. (11)
9This is not due to the law of large numbers. This is simply a stationary assumption whereby aggregate
Z(h) at the firm level does not change in time. We only focus here on steady-states of this representative
firm. One can however not rule out the possibility of having oscillations of Z for sub-representative firms
that would be leaving the aggregate Z constant. This would require a different model as regards to the
aggregation of these sub-firms.
9
Because the firm pays the firing tax only when a senior worker is dismissed, the firm’s
threat point is different when bargaining wages with senior workers. This implies
the following rule for the wage of senior workers, instead of the solution described by
equation (10):
wS(z, h) = arg max [Πz − (−T )]1−β [WS(z, h)− U ]β . (12)
It can be seen that T positively affects the firm surplus in this case, as T reduces the
outside option of the firm.
3 First order solutions and equilibrium
Given that investment in human capital can only be made upon entry, the marginal
cost of human capital investment is not considered in Nash bargaining, neither in labor
demand equations : it is sunk. We also assume the firm takes h as pre-determined.
Workers have decided about the investment before the firm takes its decisions regard-
ing factor demand.
3.1 First-order conditions and factors demand
We now introduce compact notations for first order derivatives in what follows:
FJ = ∂F (NJ , Z(h),K)/∂NJ ; FZ = ∂F (NJ , Z(h),K)/∂Z(h) ; FK = ∂F (NJ , Z(h),K)/∂K.
We drop the arguments of these derivatives unless they are different from (NJ , Z(h),K).
In the Appendix, we show that the first-order conditions of the factor demand
problem in (9) together with the envelope theorem imply the following equilibrium
conditions:
(r+λ)
c
q(θ)
= FJ−wJ− ∂wJ
∂NJ
NJ−
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z)
∂NJ
nS(z)dz−λ(1−F (R))T+λ
ˆ 1
R
ΠzdG(z),
(13)
and
r + δ = FK − ∂wJ
∂K
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z, h)
∂K
nS(z)dz. (14)
Equation (13) describes the incentives for the firm to open up new vacancies. The left-
hand side represents the marginal cost of filling a junior vacancy, while the right-hand
side is the marginal revenue the marginal junior worker brings to the firm—equal to
(r + λ)ΠJ , that is, its marginal product (first term) net of the wage (second term)
and the effect of this hiring on the wage of the other workers (third and fourth terms).
The last two terms are respectively the expected value of the firing tax (the tax itself
multiplied by its probability of layoff) and the continuation value of profits. Equation
(14) characterizes the firm’s capital investment decision. The firm purchases capital
such that the opportunity cost of capital (the left-hand side) equalizes the marginal
revenue (the right-hand side). The latter is composed by the marginal product of
capital and the effect of the capital stock on wages.
To solve for this system, we need to know the value of−λ(1−F (R))T+λ ´ 1R ΠzdG(z) =
−λT +λ ´ 1R [Πz + T ] dG(z). In particular, we need to compute Πz +T . It is given by:
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(r+λ)(Πz+T ) = FZzh−∂wJ
∂Z
zhNJ−
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
zhnS(z
′)dz′−ws(z)+rT+λ
ˆ 1
R
(Πz′+T )dG(z
′)
(15)
Equation (15) can be understood in a similar way as Equation (13).
3.2 Strategic bargaining
We have previously illustrated that the employment and capital stocks affect
wages. Both workers and firms take this into account when negotiating wages. In
particular, firms use hiring decisions as a way to strategically affect the marginal
product of labor and in turn, on equilibrium wages. This is the logic of intrafirm
bargaining in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a and b), extended to search models in Smith
(1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2008) and Bagger
and alii (2011). In the Appendix, we show that the solutions for wages resulting from
these strategic interactions follow a simple rule.
The wage is a weighted average of the reservation value of the worker rU and of the
marginal product of each type of labor, augmented (for senior workers) or diminished
(for junior workers) by the value of layoff costs:
wJ = (1− β)rU − βλT + βΩJFJ (16)
in the case of the junior wage and
wS(h, z) = (1− β)rU + βrT + βΩSFZzh (17)
for senior, where
ΩJ =
´ 1
0
1
βx
1−β
β FJ (NJx, Zx,K) dx
FJ
(18)
and
ΩS =
´ 1
0
1
βx
1−β
β FZ (NJx, Zx,K) dx
FZ
(19)
are over-employment factors resulting from strategic interactions. They are derived
and discussed in Cahuc et alii (2008, Section 2): when ΩJ and ΩS are equal to one, the
solution is the one described in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) when the production
technology is such that returns to labor are constant. When they differ from one, e.g.
with decreasing returns to scale in labor, we are away from Mortensen and Pissarides’
solution: they describe a situation of “over-employment” if they take a value larger
than 1 and “underemployment” if their value is below 1. Finally, firing taxes have
the standard effect on wages; junior wages decrease with T and senior wages increase
with T .
3.3 Job creation and destruction
By replacing the solution for wages in (13) and (15), we obtain the following job
creation rule:
c
q(θ)
= (1− β)
[
ΩJFJ − ΩSFZR(h)h
r + λ
− T
]
. (20)
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In the Appendix, we also show that job destruction rule (11) can be written as follows:
0 = ΩSFZh
(
R(h) +
λ
r + λ
ˆ 1
R
(z −R(h))dG(z)
)
− rU + rT, (21)
with rU defined in (6).
Again, these conditions differ from Mortensen and Pissarides’ through the presence
of the over-employment factors and the fact that marginal products of labor are not
necessarily constant.
3.4 Capital demand
Using the wage equations (16) and (17), we can rewrite the capital demand (14)
as
(1− β)ΩKFK = r + δ, (22)
where
ΩK =
´ 1
0
1
βx
1−β
β
−1
FK (NJx, Zx,K) dx
FK
(23)
is an over-investment factor that takes the condition away from the neo-classical in-
vestment model when its value differs from one, and is identical to the expression in
Cahuc et alii (2008, Section 4).
3.5 Human capital investment
3.5.1 The case of endogenous human capital
So far we have treated h as a parameter. However, it is chosen optimally by junior
workers prior to knowing their future idiosyncratic component z. The first-order
condition for human-capital investment of the program in (6) reads as
(r + λ)C ′(hi) =
∂wJ(h)
∂hi
+
λ
r + λG(R)
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(hi, z)
∂hi
dG(z). (24)
It is straightforward to see from the equation above that, for a given marginal effect
of hi on wages and a convex function C, lower R implies higher investment hi. The
reason is because when R is low, workers anticipate longer tenure on the job, which
increases the marginal return on human capital.10
10Here we assumed that investment in human capital is paid and decided by workers, in line with Laing
et al. (1995) or Acemoglu (1997) in the case of general human capital investment. As regards to specific
human capital investments, they are often provided by employers, as argued by Lynch and Black (1998).
Wasmer (2006) shows that for specific skill investments, it does generally not matter whether employers
or employees pay for the investment, as the outcome of the investment is to create a rent and a surplus to
the match employer-employee. Hence the logic and the determinants of the investments are the same for
employers and employees. Things would be much more asymmetrical for general skills, since there, indeed,
workers benefitiate from them but not firms. We thank a referee for making this point.
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We show in the Appendix that condition (24), which describes the incentives of
supplying human capital, can be rewritten as11
C ′(h) =
λ[1−G(R)]
r + λ
βΩS
r + λG(R)
FZ
ˆ 1
R
z
dG(z)
1−G(R) (25)
once wages are replaced by their equilibrium values.
The condition is interpreted as follows. The left-hand side of the equation is
the marginal cost of investing in human capital, while the right hand side is the
marginal return. Because investment is made upon entry and the increase in wages
only takes place once a worker becomes senior, the return has to be discounted by
a factor λ[1−G(R)]r+λ , which reflects the average time a junior worker has to wait to
become senior. The term FZ
´ 1
R z
dG(z)
1−G(R) is the expected marginal product that is
brought by each unit of human capital a given worker invests in. From this expected
marginal product, the worker will receive a share βΩS in wages, which takes into
account the bargaining power of the worker and the fact the worker will appropriate
part of the decrease in wages of other workers (if he invests in this marginal unit of
human capital). Finally, by dividing by the term r + λG(R), one obtains the present
discounted value of the marginal increase in senior wages.
3.5.2 The case of fixed human capital investment
The model can be summarized with the following equations with h = h¯, respec-
tively a job creation condition, a job destruction condition, an optimal investment
equation and the value of outside options of employed workers:
c
q(θ)
= (1− β)
[
ΩJFJ − ΩSFZRh¯
r + λ
− T
]
ΩSFZh
(
R(h) +
λ
r + λ
ˆ 1
R
(z −R)dG(z)
)
= rU − rT
(1− β)ΩKFK = r + δ
rU = b+ θq(θ)Maxhi
[
WJ − U − C(h¯)
]
.
4 Numerical examples
We resort to numerical examples to illustrate the various effects of employment
protection, reflected by the tax on lay-offs T in our model. Our strategy is as follows:
we first find a set of parameters that approximate an economy with labor-market
characteristics similar to the United States, with endogenous human capital. In this
economy, taxes on lay-offs are absent. We call this the benchmark economy. We then
ask how macroeconomic aggregates in this economy are affected by the introduction
of a firing tax in the different cases studied in the theoretical part. We also study the
case of fixed human capital in fixing the value of human capital to the endogenous
value in the benchmark economy.
11Notice that the derivative ∂wS(hi, z)/∂hi in equation (24) is calculated with respect to the stock of
human capital hi of an individual worker, not with respect to the total stock of human capital h.
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4.1 Calibration
Our benchmark economy with no firing tax resembles the economy described in
Pissarides (2009). The reason is because the theoretical model in Pissarides (2009) is a
particular case of the theoretical model we describe in Section 2. It corresponds to the
case where the supply of human capital is inelastic, the distribution G is degenerate
in zero, and the production function is linear in each of its arguments, which impedes
the firm from over-hiring. Hence, we borrow a great deal from Pissarides (2009) and
share many of his parameter values.
We assume that a unit interval of time corresponds to a month. We set the
discount rate at a 4% annual rate. The matching function is assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas m(1 − N,V ) = m0(1 − N)ηV 1−η, with unemployment elasticity η = 0.5.
We also follow common practice by setting β = η. This would internalize the search
externalities in the standard one-worker-per-firm model.12 We follow Pissarides by
targeting a labor-market tightness of 0.72, which is consistent with data from the
JOLTS and the Help-Wanted Index for the period 1960-2006. This implies a scale
parameter of the matching function m0 = 0.7.
The production function of the benchmark economy is Cobb-Douglas F (NJ , Z(h∗),K) =
A(NJ + Z(h
∗))αK1−α. We fix the labor share α to a standard value of two thirds
and the total factor productivity A = 0.54 produces a job finding rate equal to 59.4%,
which is consistent with Shimer’s (2007) monthly transitions data. In the sensitivity
analysis of Section 4.4, we consider other specifications for the production function
that help understand the economic forces at work.
We fix the parameter λ by targeting a monthly job separation rate of 3.6%, as
reported in Shimer (2007). For this exercise, we assume a uniform distribution for G
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). This produces a value for λ = 0.05, implying
that junior workers become senior after 20 months on average. The job finding and
separation rates in the benchmark economy imply an unemployment rate of 5.7%.
We rely on micro estimations of the returns to seniority to calibrate the equilib-
rium stock of human capital h∗. The structure of the cost function of investing in
human capital influences this equilibrium value. A flexible parametrization of the cost
function is
C(h) = σ1h
σ2 , (26)
σ1 being is a scale parameter and σ2 ≥ 1 influences the elasticity of the supply function
of human capital.
Several papers have estimated returns to seniority, including Abraham and Farber
(1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005).
For our calibration, we consider the recent estimates by Bunschinsky et al. (2010).
Their paper reports annual returns to seniority of about 6 percent. Let’s denote by Γ
the ratio of average senior wages to junior. Since a junior worker becomes senior at a
rate λ and our calibration considers a unit interval of time to be a month, the value
for h∗ has to be such that Γ = 1.061/12λ.
There are many combinations of the parameters σ1 and σ2 that lead a 6% annual
return. Our strategy is to fix σ2 to a specific value and then obtain the value of σ1
12Notice however that the Hosios-Pissarides efficiency rule only applies to the case without intrafirm
bargaining. When the firm chooses to over-employ, the rule has to be modified in order to account for this
additional externality. See Smith (1999).
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Table 2: Parameters: summary of the benchmark calibration
Notation Value Parameter Target/Source
r 0.0033 Discount rate 4% annual rate
b 0.71 Flow value of unemployment Hall and Milgrom (2008)
c 0.356 Vacancy cost Hall and Milgrom (2008)
m0 0.7 Scale parameter (matching) Vacancy-unemployment ratio
η 0.5 Elasticity (matching) Pissarides (2009)
β 0.5 Bargaining power β = η
λ 0.05 Productivity shock frequency Job separation rate
A 0.5374 Total factor productivity Job finding rate
σ1 0.55 Human capital cost shift parameter 6% annual return on seniority
σ2 7.5 Human capital supply elasticity Fixed
α 2/3 Labor share Labor share
δ 0.0087 Capital depreciation rate 10% annual rate
that produces a 6% annual rate of return to seniority. We choose σ2 = 7.5, giving a
supply elasticity of human capital equal to 0.15. The resulting value for σ1 is 0.55.
To compare our results to an economy without human capital, we will also consider
an economy where the cost function is vertical and the equilibrium value of human
capital is the same as in the benchmark economy: in this case, h∗ does not vary with
T .
The parameters b = 0.71 and c = 0.356, which respectively correspond to the
flow value of being unemployed and the flow cost of keeping a vacancy posted, are
also taken from Pissarides (2009). Those values are consistent with two facts from
Hall and Milgrom (2008). First, the flow value of non-work produces a realistic gap
between the flow utility of employment and unemployment. Second, the value of c
generates recruiting costs equal to 14 percent of quarterly pay per hire, which is in
line with evidence reported in Silva and Toledo (2009).
The capital depreciation rate δ is assumed to be 10% annual, consistent with
evidence in Gomme and Rupert (2007). They report depreciation rates for different
sorts of capital, and ten percent corresponds to the annual rate averaged across all
market types of capital in their paper.
4.2 Benchmark simulations with endogenous human cap-
ital h = h∗
The comparative statics exercise in this subsection is close to Ljunqvist’s (2002).
We compute steady-state equilibria for different values of the firing tax T : all param-
eters in the model are as in the benchmark economy but the tax on layoffs, and we
consider varying values of T , that range from 0 to 10. The latter value corresponds
to a tax approximately equal to one year of an average worker’s salary. Figure 2
confirms earlier findings in the literature on the impact of employment protection in
the labor market. Given that these results are well-undestood, we will only briefly
describe them. First, it is easy to understand that the introduction of a firing tax
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Figure 2: Endogenous human capital: unemployment and transition rates as a function of
the firing tax T
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lowers labor turnover.13 Second, and given this, the effect on unemployment is am-
biguous. Unemployment increases if incidence (job flows into unemployment) falls by
proportionnaly less than duration increases. This is discussed in Ljungqvist (2002):
on the one hand, workers are locked into their jobs, reducing job separations; on the
other hand, the firing tax reduces the expected gain of posting a vacancy, requiring in
equilibrium a lower vacancy to unemployment ratio so that the vacancy cost equals
the expected gain. For the simulation we propose, it turns out that the firing tax has
a positive impact on the rate of unemployment. For a tax as large as a year of an av-
erage worker’s wage, the associated unemployment rate is about 7.2% (as opposed to
6% in the benchmark economy). We illustrate in Section 4.4 that the unemployment
rate may decrease under another parametrization.
Figure 3 illustrates the hump-shaped effect of employment protection. It displays
the steady-state values of capital, employment, capital-labor ratio, human capital,
average productivity of senior workers and capital per effective labor for each one of
the cases respectively. To understand the effect on capital accumulation, remember
that capital is a complement of effective workers for the production function of the
13As shown on the bottom left panel of Figure 1, a higher firing tax is associated with a lower job
separation rate. Because the firm is reluctant to pay the tax, it is willing to keep some low-productivity
workers, who would otherwise have been dismissed absent labor regulation. This implies a lower threshold
R (see the first panel) as condition (11) suggests that the marginal value of the least productive worker
becomes more negative at larger T . As a result, the job separation rate is also lower. In turn, employment
protection generates lower labor-market tightness and job finding rate (see the first and second panel
respectively): because the firm anticipates to pay the firing tax at some moment once a worker is hired,
incentives to open up new vacancies are reduced ex ante. This negatively affects the probability to find a
job for an unemployed worker, which is confirmed by the job creation condition (20): for given values of R
and K, θ is lower at higher T .
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Figure 3: Endogenous human capital: the impact of a firing tax (T ) in the model with
endogenous specific human capital
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Note: physical capital, employment, the ratio of physical capital to labor, and human capital are all normalized to one for a T value of zero.
benchmark economy. When the stock of effective workers increases, the stock of
physical capital has to increase too and it declines when a decrease in the stock of
effective workers occurs. A firing tax thus has two opposite consequences on the
demand for capital: the first one, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), is to reduce
the reservation threshold of idiosyncratic productivity R and therefore its average
level, and finally the demand for physical capital ; the second one is to reduce labor
turnover and thus raise the incentives to invest in human capital, at a constant level of
the physical capital. This can be seen from the job creation and destruction conditions
(20), (21) and the human capital supply function (25). The increasing part of panels
(1) and (3) in Figure 3 is thus due to the fact that the second effect dominates the first
one, while, along the decreasing part of the curves, it is the first effect that dominates.
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the impact on average wages. Wages of senior workers
are decreasing in T . There are two reasons for this. First, the firm is less willing to
dismiss low-productivity workers when the firing tax is large. Second, the value of
being unemployed decreases with T too (because it becomes hard to find a job and
newly hired workers are willing to pay a large cost C(h) to obtain human capital).
This latter mechanism also explains why the wage of junior workers is decreasing in T
too. The wage of junior workers is more sensitive to T because, unlike senior workers,
junior workers do not benefit from an increase in the threat point as T increases.
Moreover, they do not have human capital.
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Figure 4: Endogenous human capital: average wages as a function of the firing tax T
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4.3 Accumulation of physical capital with fixed human
capital
Endogenous human capital generates a positive feedback effect on physical capital
investment, due to the ability of workers to respond to incentives in changing their
investment in human capital. When human capital changes, so does the demand for
capital. What happens if human capital is fixed, at the value h∗ obtain from the
benchmark model and T = 0?
In this economy, the cost function of investing in human capital is fixed and the
equilibrium value for h∗ is fixed too, both at the same level as in the benchmark
economy. We denote by h¯ and C(h¯) these fixed quantities. Figure 5 displays the
results. Beyond labor variables such as total employment, labor productivity and
the share of young workers, we report: i) the effect on the aggregate stock of capital
(first panel), ii) the capital-labor ratio (third panel) and iii) the ratio of capital to the
whole stock of efficiency units in the firm (sixth panel). The Figure shows that the
first two elements fall when the size of the firing tax increases, while the third one is
not affected by employment protection.
The intuition for these results is the following. First, we already know from Figure
2 that the employment level drops when a firing tax is introduced. Hence, the second
panel in Figure 5 shows the information similar to the fourth panel in Figure 2. Going
back to the capital demand equation (22), and with the particular structure imposed
by our calibration strategy on the production function, the number of arguments that
appear in the marginal product of capital in that equation reduces to two: the total
stock of efficiency units of labor (NJ + Z
(
h¯
)
) and capital K. Moreover, the over-
hiring factor ΩK becomes a constant equal to (1 − β + βα)−1. Hence, it suffices to
follow the total stock of efficiency units of labor: capital adjusts such that its marginal
income (the left-hand side of (22)) equals its opportunity cost (the right-hand side).
Precisely, in our simulations, a firing tax decreases the total stock of efficiency units
for three reasons. First, employment falls, as in the second panel and as already
discussed in Section 4.2. Second, the drop in the reservation productivity R makes
senior workers less productive on average. This last effect has been largely studied
in the literature, as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999), Veracierto (2001) and Lagos (2006). Third, the composition of employment
is affected: as the reservation productivity R decreases, the share of junior workers in
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Figure 5: Fixed human capital: capital and capital-to-labor ratio as a function of the firing
tax T
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Note: capital, employment, capital-to-labor ratio and the ratio of capital to efficiency units are all normalized to one for a T value of zero.
employment decreases (see fourth panel).14
Since the total stock of efficiency units in the economy decreases, the aggregate
stock of capital has to decrease too in order to keep the marginal income of capital
equal to its opportunity cost. This is a direct consequence of the constant-returns-
to-scale nature of the production function, which implies that labor efficiency units
and capital are complements in the production function. The first panel accordingly
shows a drop in the aggregate stock of capital following an increase in the firing tax.
As an illustration, our simulation suggests that the introduction of a tax equal to a
year of an average worker’s wage in the benchmark economy implies a fall by 15% in
the capital stock. This fall completely reflects the drop in the stock of labor efficiency
units.
The fall in the capital-labor ratio comes from the absence of an effect of T on the
ratio of capital to the whole stock of efficiency units. Indeed, the production function is
homogeneous of degree one, and its derivative (the marginal product) is homogeneous
of degree zero. This implies that the ratio of capital to the stock of labor efficiency
units k˜ = K/(NJ +Z(h¯)) is constant and only determined by the opportunity cost of
capital. Thus, k˜ has to be independent of employment protection for the particular
production function assumed in the calibration exercise, as observed on the last panel
of Figure 5. The other effect of T is to decrease the efficiency of workers. Combined,
the overall effect is a drop of capital per unit of labor. The observations on the first
and last panels of the Figure consequently help the analysis of the third panel, which
14This comes from the standard Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) assumption of a higher productivity for
junior workers than senior workers: this composition effect negatively impacts the total stock of efficiency
units.
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displays the impact on the capital-labor ratio. Since K decreases and k˜ remains
constant, the ratio of K to N has to decrease. As an illustration, the Figure shows
that the introduction of a tax equal to a year of an average worker’s wage generates a
decrease by 13% in the ratio. This decrease has to occur to compensate the decrease
in the average productivity of workers of a similar size.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis on human capital elasticity and
production functions
4.4.1 Other elasticities for the supply of human capital
In the Appendix, we show that the hump-shape relation between the firing tax and
the capital-labor ratio disappears when the elasticity of the supply of human capital
is either too large or too small. Section 4.3 already illustrated this for a fixed stock
of human capital (inelastic supply). When the elasticity is very large, the human
capital stock actually decreases with T , while the productivity threshold R is barely
affected. Intuitively, when T increases, the productivity of the least productive job
has to decrease. This may occur either through the idiosyncratic component z or
the stock of human capital. When the supply of human capital is very elastic, it is
through the latter component that productivity decreases.
4.4.2 Alternative production technologies, fixed h = h¯
In this subsection, we discuss the robustness of the results displayed on Figure 5
and in particular the absence of hump-shaped pattern. We consider four alternative
parametrizations, for which Figure 6 shows the comparative statics: it reports the
effect of a firing tax on employment, capital, the capital-labor ratio and capital per
efficiency units, the latter being defined as k˜ ≡ K
J+Z(h¯)
.15
In the first parametrization, which we label “low matching efficiency”, we illustrate
that the impact of the firing tax on employment can be positive. As emphasized by
Ljungqvist (2002), in matching models with highly frictional labor markets, lay-off
costs tend to increase employment by reducing labor reallocation. This parametriza-
tion accordingly considers an economy with the same production function as in the
benchmark economy, but it enhances the degree of search frictions in the labor market.
This is done by setting the scale parameter in the matching function equal to half its
value in the benchmark economy. Figure 6 confirms this idea: the dashed line shows
that employment is increasing in T . The effects on capital are qualitatively similar as
in Figure 5, for the same reasons given in Section 4.3.
The second alternative parametrization, labelled “Cobb-Douglas NJ − Z − K”,
considers another Cobb-Douglas production function of the form F (NJ , Z(h¯),K) =
ANJ
α(Z(h¯))γK1−α−γ . It shows that, though the effect of the firing tax on capital and
capital per worker is negative, it may be positive for the stock of capital per efficiency
units.
15In all the alternative parametrizations, we choose the values of the TFP A and the arrival rate λ by
targeting a job finding rate of 59.4% and a job separation rate of 3.6%. The parameter h¯ is simply fixed
to 1.
20
Third, we consider a situation where the impact on both the capital stock and
the capital-labor ratio is positively affected by an increase in the firing tax. We label
this parametrization as “J and Z-K additively separable”. We consider a production
function of the form F (NJ , Z(h¯),K) = A
[
NJ + γ
(
Z(h¯)
)α
K1−α
]
, which implies that
capital and efficiency units provided by senior workers are complements in production
as in the benchmark specification, but junior workers do not affect the marginal
product of capital anymore. Hence, because an increase in the firing tax generates an
increase in the share of senior workers in employment, the firm is given incentives to
invest in capital.
Finally, we present the case where separations are exogenous. In this situation,
the production function only depends on two factors, i.e. labor and capital. As a
consequence, the capital-labor ratio is constant and independent of T . The reason for
this is the same reason why the stock of capital per efficiency units is independent
of T in Figure 5: the marginal product of capital is homogeneous of degree zero.
Moreover, the aggregate level of employment decreases as in Pissarides (2000) and
the capital stock is negatively affected because of its complementarity with labor in
the production function. In the Appendix B, we formally show these comparative
statics. We also study the case with decreasing returns to scale, where the capital-
labor ratio is increasing in T .
5 Conclusions
This paper has attempted to clarify the role of employment protection, on economic
outcomes such as capital and capital-labor ratio. We have shown that the main effect
of employment protection on investment and the capital-labor ratio is a quite robust
negative one: because EPL reduces future profits, firms underinvest in physical capital.
This is a variant of the hold-up effect. We view this set of results as short-run ones.
However, by protecting skills, employment protection can also increase the in-
vestment in human capital and therefore, under the realistic assumption of comple-
mentarity between physical and human capital, may also increase the demand for
physical capital. Hence, the effect of employment protection can be mitigated and
even reversed.
This leads us to two conclusions : first, that specific human capital investments
(Becker 1964, Lazear 2009) are a relevant ingredients in many studies of labor market
regulations ; second, that in such contexts, labor institutions have ambiguous effects:
they are sometimes negative due to restriction they impose to the choice sets of agents
; but they can sometimes be positive when specific investments, that need to be pro-
tected, are present. This is a second best result arising from contractibility issues
over investment in physical and human capital (hold-up). It however suggests along
the line of the new public economics literature that future research should more sys-
tematically investigate the positive role of labor market institutions in the presence
of specific investments. One should in particular enrich empirical specifications in
order to account for such impacts on long-run efficiency of labor as well as short-run
efficiency costs.
Finally, although our analysis was applied in a world of perfect capital markets,
it should be stressed that the impact of credit market imperfections on the effect of
EPL, yet beyond the scope of this paper, is extremely rich and interesting. Recent
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Figure 6: Fixed human capital: capital and capital-to-labor ratio as a function of the firing
tax T , alternative parametrizations
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works such as Lalé’s (2013) and subsequent references with heterogenous wealth and
imperfect borrowing would be a good starting point for a more general analysis.
References
[1] Abraham, K. G. and Farber, H. S. 1987. Job Duration, Seniority and
Earnings, American Economic Review, 77, pp. 278–297.
[2] Acemoglu, D. (1997), ‘Training and innovation in an imperfect labour
market’, Review of Economic Studies 64(3), 445–64.
[3] Autor, David H., William R. Kerr and Adriana D. Kugler. 2007. Do
employment protections reduce productivity? Evidence from US States,
Economic Journal,
[4] Altonji, J. and Shakotko, R. 1987. Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority?
Review of Economic Studies, 54, pp. 437-459.
22
[5] Altonji, J. and Williams, N. 2005. Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority? A
Reassessment, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 58, pp. 370–397.
[6] Andrea Bassanini & Luca Nunziata & Danielle Venn, 2009. Job protec-
tion legislation and productivity growth in OECD countries, Economic
Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 24, pages 349-402, 04
[7] Arulampalam, Wiji, Mark L. Bryan and Alison L. Booth. 2004. Training
in Europe, Journal of the European Economic Association, April–May
2004, 2(2–3), pp. 346–360.
[8] Bagger, J., B.J. Christensen and Dale T. Mortensen. 2011. Wage and
Productivity Dispersion: Labor Quality or Rent Sharing?, mimeo Aarhus
Univ.
[9] Becker, Gary S. 1964 (1993, 3rd ed.). Human Capital: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education. Chicago,
University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-04120-9.
[10] Belot, Michèle, Jan Boone and Jan van Ours. 2007. Welfare-Improving
Employment Protection, Economica, 74, pp. 381–396.
[11] Berthélemy, J.-c. & Söderling, L. 2001, ‘The role of capital accumula-
tion, adjustment and structural change for economic take-off: Empiri-
cal evidence from African growth episodes’, World Development 29(2),
323–343.
[12] Brunello, Giorgio. 2004. On the Complementarity between Education
and Training in Europe, in Checchi and Lucifora, (eds.), Education,
Training and Labour Market Outcomes in Europe, Palgrave, McMillan
[13] Buchinsky, Moshe, Denis Fougere, Francis Kramarz and Rusty Tcher-
nis. 2010. Interfirm Mobility, Wages and the Returns to Seniority and
Experience in the United States, Review of Economic Studies, 77, pp.
972-1001.
[14] Cahuc, Pierre, François Marque and Etienne Wasmer. 2008. A theory
of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching
frictions, International Economic Review, 49(3), pp. 943-972.
[15] Cahuc, Pierre and EtienneWasmer. 2001. Does intrafirm bargaining mat-
ter in the large firm’s matching model? Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5, pp.
742-747.
[16] Calgagnini, Giorgio, Germana Giombini and Enrico Saltari. 2009. Finan-
cial and labor market imperfections and investment, Economics Letters,
102(1), pp. 22-26.
[17] Caselli, Francesco. 2005. Accounting for cross-country income differences,
in Handbook of Economic Growth, Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf
(eds.), edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pp. 679-741.
[18] Cingano, Federico, Marco Leonardi, Julian Messina and Giovanni Pica.
2010. The effects of employment protection legislation and financial mar-
ket imperfections on investment: evidence from a firm-level panel of EU
countries, Economic Policy, 117-163.
23
[19] Cingano, Federico, Marco Leonardi, Julian Messina and Giovanni Pica.
2014. Employment Protection Legislation, Capital Investment and Ac-
cess to Credit: Evidence from Italy, mimeo
[20] Costinot, Arnaud. 2009. Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A “New” Perspective on Pro-
tectionism. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009, vol. 7,
issue 5, pages 1011-1041
[21] Cuñat Alejandro & Marc J. Melitz, 2010. "A Many-Country, Many-Good
Model of Labor Market Rigidities as a Source of Comparative Advan-
tage," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol.
8(2-3), pages 434-441, 04-05.
[22] den Haan, W. J., Ramey, G. & Watson, J. 2000. ‘Job destruction and
propagation of shocks’, American Economic Review 90(3), 482–498.
[23] den Haan, W. J., Ramey, G. & Watson, J. 2003. Liquidity flows and
fragility of business enterprises, Journal of Monetary Economics. Volume
50, September, 1215-1241
[24] Elsby, Michael W. L. and Ryan Michaels. 2013. Marginal Jobs, Hetero-
geneous Firms, and Unemployment Flows, American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 5(1), pp. 1-48.
[25] Gomme, Paul and Peter Rupert. 2007. Theory, measurement and cali-
bration of macroeconomic models, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54,
pp. 460-497.
[26] Hall, Robert and Paul R. Milgrom. 2008. The Limited Influence of Un-
employment on the Wage Bargain, American Economic Review, 98(4),
pp. 1653-1674.
[27] Hopenhayn, Hugo and Richard Rogerson. 1993. Job Turnover and Policy
Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 101 (5), pp. 915-938.
[28] Janiak, Alexandre. 2010. Structural unemployment and the costs of firm
entry and exit, CEA working paper no 274
[29] Krause, M. U. & Lubik, T. A. 2007. ‘The (ir)relevance of real wage
rigidity in the New Keynesian model with search frictions’, Journal of
Monetary Economics 54(3), 706–727.
[30] Lagos, Ricardo. 2006. A model of TFP, Review of Economic Studies, 73,
pp. 983-1007.
[31] Laing, D., Palivos, T. &Wang, P. 1995. ‘Learning, matching and growth’,
Review of Economic Studies 62(1), 115–29.
[32] Lalé, Etienne 2013. "Worker Heterogeneity and Labor Market Frictions",
PhD thesis, Sciences-Po Paris, June.
[33] Lazear, E. 2009. Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Ap-
proach, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 117, No. 5, October
[34] Ljungqvist, Lars. 2002. How do lay-off costs affect employment? Eco-
nomic Journal, 112, pp. 829-853.
24
[35] Lynch, L. M. & Black, S. E. 1998. ‘Beyond the incidence of employer-
provided training’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52(1), 64–81
[36] Mortensen, Dale and Christopher Pissarides. 1994. Job Creation and
Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment, Review of Economic
Studies, 61(3), pp. 397-415.
[37] Mortensen, Dale and Christopher Pissarides. 1999. New developments in
models of search in the labor market, in Handbook of Labor Economics,
Vol. 3, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (Eds), chapter 39, pp. 2567-
2627.
[38] OECD. 2004. OECD Employment Outlook, chapter 2.
[39] Pissarides, Christopher. 1985. Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Un-
employment, Vacancies, and Real Wages, American Economic Review,
75 (4), pp. 676-690.
[40] Pissarides, Christopher. 1990. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Ox-
ford, Basil Blackwell, London.
[41] Pissarides, Christopher. 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, MIT
Press.
[42] Pissarides, Christopher. 2009. The unemployment volatility puzzle: is
wage stickiness the answer? Econometrica, 77 (5), pp. 1339-1369.
[43] Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales 1998. Financial dependence and
growth, American Economic Review, 88, 559-586.
[44] Saint-Paul, G., 1997. Is labour rigidity harming Europe’s competitive-
ness? The effect of job protection on the pattern of trade and welfare.
European Economic Review 41, 499}506.
[45] Saint-Paul, G., 2002. "Employment protection, innovation, and interna-
tional specialization”, European Economic Review, 46, 2, 375-395
[46] Saint-Paul, G. 2002. The Political Economy of Employment Protection,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 3 (June 2002), pp. 672-704.
[47] Shimer, Robert. 2007. Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment,
NBER working paper 13421.
[48] Silva, José and Manuel Toledo. 2009. Labor Turnover Costs And The
Cyclical Behavior Of Vacancies And Unemployment, Macroeconomic
Dynamics, 13(S1), pp. 76-96.
[49] Smith, Eric. 1999. Search, concave production, and optimal firm size.
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2(2), pp. 456-471.
[50] Stole, Lars A. and Jeffrey Zwiebel. 1996a. Intrafirm bargaining under
non-binding contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 63, pp. 375-410.
[51] Stole, Lars A. and Jeffrey Zwiebel. 1996b. Organizational design and
technology choice under intrafirm bargaining. American Economic Re-
view, 86(1), pp. 195-222.
[52] Topel, R. H. 1991. Specific Capital, Mobility and Wages: Wages Rise
with Job Seniority, Journal of Political Economy, 99, pp. 145–176.
25
[53] Veracierto, Marcelo. 2001. Employment flows, capital mobility, and pol-
icy analysis, International Economic Review, 42(3), pp.571-596.
[54] Walsh, C. E. 2005. ‘Labor market search, sticky prices, and interest rate
policies’, Review of Economic Dynamics 8(4), 829–849.
[55] Wasmer, E. 2006. ”Interpreting Europe-US Labor Market Differences
: the Specificity of Human Capital Investments’, American Economic
Review, June, Volume 96(3), pp 811-831.
[56] Yashiv, Eran. 2014. Capital Values, Job Values and the Joint Behav-
ior of Hiring and Investment, mimeo, Tel Aviv University.
A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium
A.1.1 First-order conditions
Differentiating the right hand side of (9) with respect to V and setting it equal to
zero gives
−c+ ΠJq(θ) = 0, (27)
while the condition for I is
ΠK = 1, (28)
with ΠK being the marginal value of capital.
The marginal return on a junior employee and capital are:
(r+λ)ΠJ = FJ −wJ − ∂wJ
∂NJ
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z, h)
∂NJ
nS(z)dz−λT +λ
ˆ 1
R
[Πz′ + T ] dG(z
′)
(29)
and
(r + δ)ΠK = FK − ∂wJ
∂K
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z, h)
∂K
nS(z)dz. (30)
Conditions (13) and (14) are obtained by combining (27) with (29) and (28) with
(30) respectively.
A.1.2 Wages
The Nash bargaining rule (10), combined with (7) and (29), give the following
formulation for wages of junior workers:
wJ = β
[
FJ − ∂wJ
∂NJ
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z, h)
∂NJ
nS(z)dz − λT + λ
ˆ 1
R
[Πz + T ] dG(z)
]
− (1− β)
[
λ
ˆ 1
R
[WS(z, h)− U ] dG(z)− rU
]
The same Nash bargaing rule allows to establish that
(1− β)λ
ˆ 1
R
[WS(z, h)− U ] dG(z) = βλ
ˆ 1
R
[Πz + T ] dG(z). (31)
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Hence,
wJ = β
[
FJ − ∂wJ
∂NJ
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z, h)
∂NJ
nS(z)dz − λT
]
+ (1− β)rU. (32)
Similarly, the rule (12) together with (8) and (15), imply that
wS(z, h) = β
[
FZzh− ∂wJ
∂nS(z)
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z, h)
∂nS(z)
nS(z)dz + rT
]
+ (1− β)rU. (33)
Given the results by Cahuc et al. (2008), we conjecture that the solution to the system
of differential equations described by (32) and (33) is (16) and (17). To verify our
conjecture in the case of the wage of junior workers, we derive (16) and (17) with
respect to NJ . We obtain:
∂wJ
∂NJ
=
ˆ 1
0
x
1
β
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(NJx)∂(NJx)
dx (34)
and
∂wS(z, h)
∂NJ
=
ˆ 1
0
x
1
β
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(Zx)∂(NJx)
zhdx. (35)
Comparing (16) and (32), our conjecture is correct if
βΩJFJ = β
(
FJ − ∂wJ
∂NJ
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z, h)
∂NJ
nS(z)dz
)
(36)
Replacing the derivatives of (16) and (17) with respect to NJ in the equation above
indicates that the conjecture can be verified if
βΩJFJ = β
[
FJ −
ˆ 1
0
x
1
β
(
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(NJx)∂(NJx)
NJ +
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(Zx)∂(NJx)
Zh
)
dx
]
(37)
Finally, by integrating by parts the right hand side of the equation above, one can
verify that the conjecture is correct.
The conjecture can be verified in a similar way in the case of wages of senior
workers.
Moreover, notice that (16) and (17) can be rewritten as
wJ = βΩjFJ + (1− β)b+ βθc− βλT − (1− β)θq(θ)C(h) (38)
and
wS(z, h) = βΩSFZzh+ (1− β)b+ βθc+ βrT − (1− β)θq(θ)C(h), (39)
in general equilibrium, by use of equation (6) together with (10), (12) and (27).
A.1.3 Job destruction
The job destruction relation is obtained as follows. First, replace wages and their
derivatives in (29) to get
(r + λ)ΠJ = (1− β) [ΩJFJ − rU − λT ] + λ
ˆ 1
R
(Πz + T )dG(z). (40)
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Similarly, from (15), we have
(r + λ) (Πz + T ) = (1− β) [ΩSFZzh− rU + rT ] + λ
ˆ 1
R
(Πz + T )dG(z). (41)
It follows that
(r + λ) (Πz −ΠR) = (1− β)ΩSFZ(z −R)h. (42)
Given that ΠR + T = 0,
Πz =
1− β
r + λ
ΩSFZ(z −R)h− T. (43)
Evaluating (41) for z = R and combining it with (43) yields the job destruction
condition:
0 = (1− β) [ΩSFZR(h)h− rU + rT ] + λ
ˆ 1
R
1− β
r + λ
ΩSFZ(z −R(h))hdG(z). (44)
Finally, replacing rU , in the equation above, by
rU = b+ θ
β
1− β c (45)
gives (21).
A.1.4 Job creation
Combining (29) with (15), together with the solution for wages, we have
(r + λ)(ΠJ −Πz) = (1− β) (ΩJFJ − ΩSFZzh) + β(r + λ)T. (46)
If we notice that ΠR + T = 0 and given the result in (27), we can obtain equation
(20) by evaluating this equation at z = R.
A.1.5 Capital
The capital demand (22) is obtained from the marginal value of capital (30). Notice
first that the derivatives of wages with respect to capital write as
∂wJ
∂K
=
ˆ 1
0
x
1−β
β
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(NJx)∂K
dx (47)
and
∂wS(z, h)
∂K
=
ˆ 1
0
x
1−β
β
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(Zx)∂K
zhdx. (48)
Replacing them into (30) implies
r+δ = FK−
ˆ 1
0
x
1−β
β
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(NJx)∂K
NJdx−
ˆ 1
0
x
1−β
β
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(Zx)∂K
Zdx, (49)
which is equivalent to
r + δ = FK −
ˆ 1
0
x
1−β
β
[
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(NJx)∂K
NJ +
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(Zx)∂K
Z
]
dx. (50)
By integrating by parts the integral in the equation above, one can get equation (22).
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A.1.6 Human capital investment
The worker’s maximization program is given by
max
hi
WJ(hi)− C(hi),
with the participation constraint
WJ(hi)− U ≥ C(hi).
This leads to the first-order condition:
(r + λ)C ′(hi) =
∂wJ
∂hi
+ λ
ˆ 1
R(h)
∂WS(hi, z)
∂hi
dG(z)− λ∂R(h)
∂hi
[WS(hi, R)− U ] g(R).
Given that the worker’s surplus is zero for z = R, we have that [WS(h,R)− U ] = 0.
This condition simplifies as
(r + λ)C ′(hi) =
∂wJ
∂hi
+ λ
ˆ 1
R(h)
∂WS(h, z)
∂hi
dG(z).
Given the formulation in (8), one can calculate
(r + λ)
∂WS(hi, z)
∂hi
=
∂wS(hi, z)
∂hi
+ λ
ˆ 1
R(h)
∂WS(hi, z)
∂h
dG(z)
Similarly,
(r + λG(R))
ˆ 1
R
∂WS(hi, z)
∂hi
dG(z) =
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(hI , z)
∂hi
dG(z).
Given the wage equation
wS(z, hi) = (1− β)rU + βrT + βΩSFZzhi, (51)
where
ΩS =
´ 1
0
1
βx
1−β
β FZ (NJx, Zx,K) dx
FZ
, (52)
we can calculate the derivative of the wage of a senior worker with respect to hi:
∂wS(hi, z)
∂hi
= βΩSFZz +
ˆ 1
0
x
1
β
∂2F (NJx, Zx,K)
∂(Zx)∂(Zx)
dxnS(z)z
2hidi (53)
Notice that the derative in the above equation is made with respect to hi and not
with respect to the total level of human capital h.
By letting di → 0 in (53) and replacing it in the first order condition for human
capital, we obtain the condition (25).
B The model with exogenous separations and
fixed h¯ = 1
In this section we analyze a slightly different version of the model, with exogenous
job separations. We show that an increase in the firing tax on the capital-labor ratio
is positive or null depending on the form one assumes for the production function.
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B.1 Equilibrium
Instead of assuming that the amount of efficiency units endowed by workers evolves
stochastically according to a Poisson process, we consider that all workers own the
same unit amount. This implies that the firm does not choose to destroy jobs endoge-
nously as in the main text and labor heterogeneity does not appear anymore. Now
separations occur exogenously at a rate s. We denote here by FN = ∂F (N,K)/∂N
and as before we drop the argument unless they are different from (N,K):
In this setting the relations describing the equilibrium of the economy are the
following:
N =
θq(θ)
θq(θ) + s
, (54)
c
q(θ)
=
(1− β) (ΩNFN − b− sT )− βθc
r + s
(55)
and
(1− β)ΩKFK = r + δ, (56)
where
ΩN =
´ 1
0
1
βx
1−β
β FN (Nx,K) dx
FN
(57)
and
ΩK =
´ 1
0
1
βx
1−β
β
−1
FK (Nx,K) dx
FK
. (58)
Equations (54) and (56) are the counterparts of (3) and (22) when separations are
exogenous and (55) is the equivalent of the free-entry condition from Pissarides (1985).
Notice that we consider that workers earn the outside wage as in Pissarides (2000).
B.2 The impact of a firing tax on the capital-labor ratio
With exogenous separations, the effect of a firing tax on the capital-labor ratio is
analogous to the effect of a labor tax in a frictionless framework. Two effects appear.
First, firms substitute away from labor because the relative cost of labor increases.
This can be shown by manipulating equations (55) and (56), which leads to
(1− β)ΩK
ΩN
FK
FN
=
r + δ
(r + s) cq(θ) + βθc+ (1− β)(b+ sT )
. (59)
The left hand side of the equation is analogous to the standard marginal rate of
transformation that appears in relations describing the equilibrium of a Walrasian
economy, while the right hand side is analogous to the relative cost of labor. We see
from this equation that an increase in T leads to an increase in the capital-labor ratio,
for a given labor-market tightness θ.
Of course, the labor-market tightness also reacts to a change in T . This observation
leads us to a second effect: an increase in T implies a decrease in θ. This effect goes
in the opposite direction as it negatively affects the capital-labor ratio.
We now illustrate those two effects through two specific examples: i) the case where
the production function displays constant returns to scale and ii) a Cobb-Douglas case
with decreasing returns.
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Let us first consider the case with constant returns to scale. Under this assumption,
it is easy to see from equation (56) that the capital-labor ratio is not affected by an
increase in the firing tax T . Moreover, given this result, the labor-market tightness
has to decrease (see equation (55)) as well as employment (see equation (54)). Because
the capital-labor ratio is not affected and N decreases, the aggregate stock of capital
has to decrease too.
In the second example, we assume the production function takes the following
form:
F (N,K) = NαKν , (60)
with α > 0, ν > 0 and α+ ν < 1.
With this production function, equations (55) and (56) can be rewritten as
c
q(θ)
=
(1− β)
(
αkνN(θ)α+ν−1
1−β+βα − b− sT
)
− βθc
r + s
(61)
and
1− β
1− β + βανN(θ)
α+ν−1kν−1 = r + δ (62)
respectively, where k ≡ KN and N(θ) is given by equation (54), an increasing relation
of θ.
Equation (61) describes an increasing relation between the capital-labor ratio k
and the labor-market tightness θ, while equation (62) is decreasing in the space (k, θ).
Hence, an increase in T leads to a decrease in θ and an increase in k with this
production function.
C Sensitivity : numerical exercises for other elas-
ticities for the human capital supply function
In this Appendix, we illustrate how the comparative statics in Section 4.2 may
change when one considers alternative values for the human capital supply function.
Specifically, we are interested in understanding under which circumstances, the U-
shaped pattern may not appear anymore.
C.1 The effect of a firing tax when the supply of human
capital is imperfectly elastic (high or low elasticities)
The hump-shaped pattern of capital does not appear in the two more extreme
situations where the supply elasticity is either large or low, as in Figures 7 and 8
respectively. In Figure 7, which shows the case of an infinitely elastic supply of human
capital (i.e. the cost function is linear), the reservation productivity is independent of
T and the stock of human capital is a decreasing function of it. In the Appendix C.2,
we formally show that this result always hold when the supply of human capital is
infinitely elastic. The intuition is the following. When T increases, the productivity
of the least productive job has to decrease. In this context, productivity has to be
understood as a combination of the idiosyncratic component z and the stock of human
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Figure 7: Endogenous human capital: the impact of a firing tax (T ) with high elasticity of
human capital supply
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Note: physical capital, employment, the ratio of physical capital to labor, and human capital are all normalized to one for a T value of zero.
capital. It turns out that when the supply of human capital is very elastic, it is through
a change in the latter component that productivity decreases.
Moreover, Figure 7 shows that employment, capital and the capital-labor ratio
decrease with T . The first outcome is due to the fact that only the job finding rate
is affected by T in this case, the job separation rate being kept constant since R is
not affected. Second, because employment decreases and workers are less productive,
capital has to decrease as well: it is a complementary factor. Third, the fall in the
capital-labor ratio is due to the fall in productivity as in Section 4.2. The value for σ1
we consider in this graph is 3.09 (it is the value that yields 6% annual rate of return
to seniority).
In Figure 8 we consider a low supply elasticity. We fix σ2 at 40. This produces
an elasticity of 2.56%. The resulting calibrated value for σ1 is close to zero. Figure 8
and Figure 7 display similar comparative statics with the exception that employment
increases in this specific example. In our simulations, for all of the cases where no
hump-shaped pattern appears, we found that the stock of capital and the capital-labor
ratio are always negatively affected by an increase in T . This is a natural result as
we come back to a situation that resembles the one in Section 4.2 in those cases.
C.2 The effect of a firing tax when the supply of human
capital is perfectly elastic
Here we formally show that, when the production function is the one we consider in
the benchmark economy and the cost of investing in human capital is a linear function
of h, a firing tax is always associated with less human capital, less physical capital,
less employment, lower capital-labor ratio, lower tightness and leave the reservation
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Figure 8: Endogenous human capital: the impact of a firing tax (T ) with low elasticity of
supply of human capital
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productivity R unaffected.
Define
kˆ ≡ K
NJ + Zh
=
K
N
1
ξj + (1− ξj)z¯Rh,
the stock of capital per effective worker, where ξj is the share of junior workers in em-
ployment and z¯R is the average value of z among senior workers, increasing functions
of R.
From (22), one can obtain kˆ immediately. It is independent of T . This is because
F is homogeneous of degree one in two arguments, physical capital K and effective
workers (NJ + Zh).
Given a value for kˆ, (25) allows to get R. Hence, R also is independent of T . The
independence of R implies that ξj and z¯R do not depend on T either.
The rest of the analysis resembles Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), but instead
of considering the space (θ,R) for the job creation and destruction relations, one
considers the space (θ, h). The job creation relation is decreasing in this space and
the job destruction is increasing. A firing tax unambiguously decreases h and θ in the
same manner as it decreases R and θ in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
As a consequence, the effect on employment is negative because θ decreases and
R is not affected. Given hˆ is independent of T and both N and h decrease for an
increase in T , K has to decrease as well.
From the definition of hˆ above, the capital-labor ratio has to decrease because h
decreases.
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D Online Appendix (not for publication): Deter-
mination of equation 15
Deriving the profit function in equation (9) with respect to nS(z) we have:
∂Π¯
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
=
1
1 + rdt
{(
FZ
∂Z
∂ns(z)
− ∂wJ
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
NJ−
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
nS(z
′)dz′
−ws(z) ∂NS
∂ns(z)
−λG(R)T ∂NS
∂ns(z)
)
dt+
∂Π¯
∂Z ′
[(1−λdt) ∂Z
∂ns(z)
+λ
∂NS
∂ns(z)
ˆ 1
R
g(z′)z′hdz′dt]
}
and, after multiplication by (1 + rdt), we have:
(1 + rdt)
∂Π¯
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
=
(
FZ
∂Z
∂ns(z)
− ∂wJ
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
nS(z
′)dz′
−ws(z) ∂NS
∂ns(z)
−λG(R)T ∂NS
∂ns(z)
)
dt+
∂Π¯
∂Z ′
[(1−λdt) ∂Z
∂ns(z)
+λ
∂NS
∂ns(z)
ˆ 1
R
g(z′)z′hdz′dt]
we obtain in a steady-state:
(r+λ)dt
∂Π¯
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
=
(
FZ
∂Z
∂ns(z)
− ∂wJ
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
nS(z
′)dz′
− ws(z) ∂NS
∂ns(z)
− λG(R)T ∂NS
∂ns(z)
)
dt+
∂Π¯
∂Z
∂NS
∂ns(z)
λ
ˆ 1
R
g(z′)z′hdz′dt
Dividing by dt:
(r + λ)
∂Π¯
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
= FZ
∂Z
∂ns(z)
− ∂wJ
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
NJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
nS(z
′)dz′
− ws(z) ∂NS
∂ns(z)
− λG(R)T ∂NS
∂ns(z)
+
∂Π¯
∂Z
∂NS
∂ns(z)
λ
ˆ 1
R
g(z′)z′hdz′
Terms in ∂NS∂ns(z) can be removed, in noticing that
∂Z
∂ns(z)
= zh ∂NS∂ns(z) :
(r + λ)
∂Π¯
∂Z
zh = FZzh− ∂wJ
∂Z
zhNJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
zhnS(z
′)dz′ − ws(z)
− λG(R)T + ∂Π¯
∂Z
λ
ˆ 1
R
g(z′)z′hdz′
or
(r + λ)
∂Π¯
∂Z
zh = FZzh− ∂wJ
∂Z
zhNJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
zhnS(z
′)dz′ − ws(z)
− λG(R)T + λ
ˆ 1
R
∂Π¯
∂Z
z′hdG(z′)
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Use the definition of Πz = ∂Π¯∂Z
∂Z
∂ns(z)
:
(r + λ)Πz = FZzh− ∂wJ
∂Z
zhNJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
zhnS(z
′)dz′ − ws(z)
− λG(R)T + λ
ˆ 1
R
Πz′dG(z
′)
Add up (r + λ)T on both sides:
(r + λ)(Πz + T ) = FZzh− ∂wJ
∂Z
zhNJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
zhnS(z
′)dz′ − ws(z)
+ rT + λG(R)T + λ[1−G(R)]T − λG(R)T + λ
ˆ 1
R
Πz′dG(z
′)
Simple manipulation leads to :
(r + λ)(Πz + T ) = FZzh− ∂wJ
∂Z
zhNJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
zhnS(z
′)dz′ − ws(z)
+ rT + λ[1−G(R)]T + λ
ˆ 1
R
Πz′dG(z
′)
Insert λ[1−G(R)]T into the integral and one obtains equation (63) that is precisely
equation (15) in the text:
(r + λ)(Πz + T ) = FZzh− ∂wJ
∂Z
zhNJ −
ˆ 1
R
∂wS(z
′)
∂Z
zhnS(z
′)dz′ − ws(z)
+ rT + λ
ˆ 1
R
(Πz′ + T )dG(z
′) (63)
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